This appendix is an online companion to the main text. The biosensor analysis is carried out in §1, and the symptomatic priority policy and the ring policy are analyzed in §2 and §3, respectively. The spatial aggregation across service zones is performed in §4, a comparison of biosensors and antibiotics is presented in §5, and the optimal static allocation of antibiotic servers across service zones is derived in §6.
text can be expressed as
We use three approximations to estimate the expected minimum detectable attack size, Q * . First, we substitute the Taylor series approximation (x * − m X + w) −2d ∼ (x * − m x ) −2d − 2dw(x * − m x ) −2d−1
into the left side of (1) to get
We then use a crude iterative method: let m x = 0 be an initial estimate, and substitute this value on the right side of (2) to get our estimate, m S x , for the x coordinate of the location separating the two regions: .
Therefore, the maximum dose of a biosensor is approximately 
Setting the quantities in (5) equal to l b and solving for Q, we estimate the minimum detectable size of a release to be 
As a last approximation, to get a deterministic estimate for Q * we set m x and m y equal to the midpoint of their range (i.e., m x = w/2, m y = w/4) and get 
which coincides with the dense-limit result (equation (34) in the main text) as w → 0. The exponential term in (7) causes this approximation for Q * to increase rapidly for sufficiently large values of w. To find the range of applicability of this approximation, we determine the value of w that generates a 10% increase over the dense limit, assuming that the other terms in (7) remain at their dense limit values (i.e., that x * + w/2 ∼ x * − w/2 ∼ x * ). This occurs when
Using (37) in the main text and solving for w, we find that (7) breaks down at
Our second line of attack, appropriate for intermediate values of w, also uses three approximations.
First, we assume that the downwind biosensor is always the biosensor that receives the maximum dose.
While this assumption causes us to overestimate the size of the smallest detectable attack, it is likely to be accurate if w is significantly larger than x * . In this case, the expected maximum dose received at a sensor, given a release of size Q, is
Because
we approximate (10) by
We can then substitute the Taylor series approximations
and
into (12) and integrate to get
Solving for Q gives
If we define
and make the Taylor series approximation e −c 3 ∼ 1 − c 3 + 2 , then (16) simplifies to
series approximation e
≈ 1 again allows the integral in (12) to be taken explicitly,
The assumption x * w allows us to make the further approximations (
Setting this result equal to l b and solving for Q gives
as an estimate for the limiting behavior of Q * as w → ∞.
Analysis of the Symptomatic Priority Policy
This section considers the symptomatic priority policy in (30)-(31) of the main text in the overcongested case, where asymptomatic people in the antibiotics queue are only served if the number of servers exceeds the number of symptomatics in queue. As in §4 of the main text, we begin our analysis by studying the antibiotics queue. We approximate the queue lengths by dividing the time interval [τ, t e ] into two phases. From time τ to time t s , we assume that the Q A 2 (τ ) + Q A 3 (τ ) people who are symptomatic at time τ are served. Hence, the first phase ends at time
at which time we have
and Q A 1 (t) is exponentially decreasing during phase one. The asymptomatic people are served in the second phase, and we make the simplifying assumption that all servers are always busy distributing antibiotics to the asymptomatic people (in reality, a small fraction of these servers will be processing the new symptomatics), giving for t ∈ [t s , t e ],
Letting
, we can solve (23)- (24) in terms of the unknown function g(t),
Substituting these solutions into the definition of g(t) gives the following integral equation that g(t)
must satisfy,
The substitution z(t) = t ts g(u) du turns (27) into the differential equatioṅ
which can be rewritten in the separable form
The solution, using the initial condition z(t s ) = 0, is
Because g = z, equations (25)- (26) can be expressed as
where z(t) is given in (30). Equations (31)- (32) hold until the antibiotics queue empties at time t e , which is computed by solving for when z(t) goes to infinity in (30).
Now we mimic equation (48) in the main text to find the number of deaths in the overcongested
regime. For simplicity, we assume that during the relatively short duration of the first phase, people in stage 2 are in a competing exponentials situation (i.e., service versus progression), whereas the queue congestion during the first phase implies that an exponential versus uniform competition would be more realistic. The result is
where (33) follows from the fact (see Table 1 in the main text) that µ A r 2 . To carry out the integrations in (33), we observe that r 1 Q A 1 (t) + g(t)Q A 1 (t) is exactly −Q A 1 (t). However, the constants in front of each integral in (33) are different. We only need to compute the easier of the two integrals because for any constants a and b we have
Turning to the integral of Q A 1 (t), we have by (30) and (32) that
We could directly integrate this expression, but the result is simpler and quite accurate if we replace the logarithmic term with its first-order Taylor expansion, which gives
where
Using (34), we rewrite equation (33) as
Finally, substituting in the integrations, we find that the approximate number of deaths is
Computational results (not shown here) reveal that (38) is quite accurate (e.g., similar to Figures 4 and 5 in the main text), except when the time to distribute antibiotics exceeds about 8 days. While the expression in (38) is rather cumbersome, it still allows for some observations. As in the mass service case, the number of deaths is linear in the number infected, and the fraction of infected people who die is linearly decreasing in both the prophylactic and treatment antibiotic efficacies. Substituting base-case parameter values yields
Substituting the base-case parameter values of e 1 and e 2 into (39)-(40), we find that the fraction of infected people who die is reduced from 0.292 for the mass service policy to 0.243 for the symptomatic priority policy; this 0.049 difference is considerably larger than the 0.004 difference in the base case in Wein et al. (2003) , which assumes log-normal disease progression. Numerical computations (not shown here) reveal that the difference in performance between these two policies goes down as t e − τ is reduced. Comparing the coefficients in (39)-(40) with those in (64)-(65) in the main text shows that the impact of prophylactic effectiveness is slightly greater under the symptomatic priority policy than the mass service policy. As in the mass service case, prophylactic efficacy is about three times more effective on a percentage basis than treatment efficacy. 
The quantity D 1 was computed in §2, and consists of those who are in stage 2 at time τ and all those who enter stage 2 during [τ, t s ], The bulk of the people in this time interval start out in Q A 0 and Q A 1 . Let L R be the number of people who progress from Q A 1 all the way to Q A 3 before getting served, let S denote the number of people who get served from compartment Q A 2 , and let G be the number of people who enter compartment
, where the last term in D 3 represents those who are served while in stage 1, but the antibiotics are not effective.
We calculate the quantities G and L R from a probablistic analysis, under the reasonably accurate assumption that Q A 1 (t) drops linearly to zero throughout this time interval. Given that someone enters stage 2 at time t, we have a competition between an exp(r 2 ) random variable, call it X 2 , and a U [t, t e + ∆t] random variable denoted by U (t). This competition yields
Substituting
into (45) and integrating gives
The quantity G is simply all those who enter stage 2 by progressing from Q A 1 ,
Equations (44), (47) and (48) give
By (12) in the main text, (41), (42), (43) and (49), the total number of deaths is approximately 
Note that the coefficient in front of the ring delay parameter ∆t in (51) is identical to the coefficient for the time it takes to distribute antibiotics in (63) in the main text. For small ∆t, we directly compute the impact of the ring parameter p, via
dtp dtp dp = bN r 1 (I 1 (0)−pN ) , which follows from (24) in the main text, (51) and the fact that ∆t = t p − t s . Plugging in base values, with I 1 (0) = 0.5N (Table 1) Finally, we note that in the limiting case p = 1, where only symptomatic people are given antibiotics, the overcongested estimate is simply
Spatial Aggregation
We derive equation (69) in the main text in this section. While we have not been able to integrate (68) in the main text, for a release size less than about eight grams (roughly the amount in all the tainted envelopes in the 2001 postal attack), the first argument in the minimum function in (68) in the main text is not needed, and the total number of infected people is given by
As an illustration of how the biosensor analysis in §3 of the main text, the analysis of a service zone in §4-5 of the main text, and the spatial aggregation across zones in §6 of the main text can be combined to assess policy tradeoffs, in this section we compare the value of biosensors and rapid antibiotic distribution, under both exponential and log-normal disease progression. We focus on a release of 10 15 spores, and refer readers to 
For the log-normal case, Theorem 5.8 of Balkema and de Haan (1978) implies that
where F (x) is the cdf of the log-normal incubation period.
To compute the detection delay via biosensors, we fix the detection limit at l b = 10, 000 spores, which is roughly the inhaled dose that would infect half the population. We investigate variations in the time delay to obtain test results, τ b , which is dictated by the frequency and turnaround time of 
Static Allocation of Antibiotic Servers
In this section, we consider the optimal static allocation of antibiotic servers across service zones.
Suppose that post-attack situational awareness is such that the location of the attack and an estimate of the number of infected people in each service zone are known (e.g., Kaplan 2004 ). LetĨ k be the estimated number of infected people in service zone k = 1, . . . , K. Adapting the notation in Table 1 in the main text, let N k be the population size of zone k and let n Ak be our decision variable, which is the number of antibiotic servers allocated to zone k. Supposen A antibiotic servers are available to allocate across the K service zones. The number of deaths in zone k is approximatelyĨ k times the right side of equation (49) in the main text, where by (44) in the main text we replace t e − τ by
